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TITLE X-DANGEROUS SPECIAL OFFENDER SENTENCING
I. INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly the most controversial new provision in the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970 is title X. Title X authorizes a
federal prosecuting attorney to notify the defendant and the court
before trial that the defendant, if found guilty of the felony on
which he is being tried, is in the prosecutor's opinion also subject
to the dangerous special offender provisions embodied in the
title.1 Should the defendant be judged guilty of the felony, he then
will fall subject to an additional penalty beyond that received for
the conviction if the judge finds that he qualifies as one of three
types of special offenders: recidivists, professional offenders
whose crimes involve special skill or expertise, and conspirators?
In addition to establishing that the defendant fits within one of
these categories, the prosecutor must also show that the defend-
ant is so dangerous that a longer period of confinement than that
provided by the sentence on the felony conviction is needed to
protect the public. 3
The determination of whether the title X special offender provi-
sions are applicable is made by the judge sitting without the jury
in a special sentencing hearing. 4 In addition to his right to be
present at the hearing, the defendant is entitled to representation
by counsel; to limited inspection of the presentence report; to
cross-examination of witnesses; and to compulsory process. 5 No
limitation is placed on the type of information that the judge may
consider in making his determination. 6 If dangerous special
offender status is established "by the preponderance of the in-
formation," 7 the judge is authorized to impose a sentence of up to
twenty-five years imprisonment in addition to the sentence for the
underlying felony conviction.8 Both the defendant and the United
1 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(a) (Supp. 1971).
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(b), (e) (Supp. 1971).
3 Id. § 3575(g).
4 Id. § 3575(b).
5 Id. In extraordinary cases, the court may withhold material not relevant to a proper
sentence, diagnostic opinions which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation,
any source of information obtained on a promise of confidentiality, and material previously
disclosed in open court.
6 18 U.S.C.A. § 3577 (Supp. 1971).
7 Id. § 3575(b).
8 Id.
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States prosecutor may appeal the judge's findings and decision
reached in a title X proceeding. 9
The incorporation of this title was prompted by a Senate staff
study for the Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures which revealed that of all organized crime figures
sentenced in federal courts from 1960 to 1969, two-thirds faced
maximum jail terms of only five years or less, and fewer than
one-quarter of these received a maximum sentence. 10 Moreover,
in those cases since 1960 where the federal judge possessed
discretion in his sentencing, only a bare majority of those con-
victed received as much as half the maximum sentence.'1 Several
defendants, although found guilty, received no jail sentences.
Congress also was persuaded to enact title X because of the
complexity of an organized crime network, and the serious threat
it poses to the economic and political well-being of the nation. 12
As these reasons for title X indicate, the title was passed
principally to curtail the activity of organized crime. The hearings
in both the Senate and House spoke exclusively in terms of such
organized crime offenders. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the
title that would limit its application to organized crime since it
applies to virtually any "dangerous" defendant involved in the
furtherance of a conspiracy involving four or more people.' 3 It
also applies to any criminal who in performing his trade exhibits
special skills. Yet, within the definitions is the potential that title
X would apply to the publisher of an underground newspaper
convicted on obscenity charges and found to be dangerous under
the questionable definition of section 3575(t). In addition, many
student militants or civil rights workers would qualify under the
same provisions if found guilty of some underlying felony. 14 Such
a broad scope of application did not slip by the Senate unnoticed.
91d. § 3576.
10 28 CONG. QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, July 17, 1970, No. 29 at 1812.
11 Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91 st Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1970).
12 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 188 states that
[t]he purpose of organized crime is not competition with visible, legal govern-
ment but nullification of it. When organized crime places an official in public
office, it nullifies the political process. When it bribes a police official it
nullifies law enforcement.
13 Presumably it would not be difficult to prove that a participant in a conspiracy, at
some point, agreed to help plan or organize it. Indeed, under the wording of § 3575(e)(3),
the underling who says "Hey, why don't we try this," or "I've got a better idea" qualifies
for special offender status if the element of dangerousness is also found.
14 Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 472 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings] (remarks of Lawrence Speiser, speaking for the American Civil Liber-
ties Union).
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One senator introduced an amendment that would limit the force
of the bill to those felonies enumerated in title IX of this Act on
the rationale that this limitation would confine the application of
such severe penalties to those persons to whom the Act was
meant to apply-organized crime offenders. 15 His amendment was
soundly defeated.' 6
The difficulty that will be encountered in determining what
individuals fall within the provisions of the Act creates a potential
conflict with the constitutional doctrine of void for vagueness.
Many other constitutional arguments also arise from other lan-
guage in title X. The remainder of this discussion will concentrate
on examining the validity of several constitutional attacks which
undoubtedly will eventually be directed at this title.
II. VOID FOR VAGUENESS
The Supreme Court has on many occasions addressed the
question of what to do with a statute containing terms which seem
indefinite and vague. 17 In Connally v. General Construction Co.18
the Court declared:
[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation, violates the first essential of due process of law.19
In Lanzetta v. New Jersey20 the Court held the essence of the
vagueness doctrine to be that -[n]o one may be required at peril
of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes." 21 This requirement of prior statutory definition serves
to limit the discretion and minimize possible prejudice on the part
of those who administer the criminal justice system. 22
15 116 CONG. REC. S415 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1970) (remarks of Senator Edward Kennedy
of Massachusetts).
16 Id. at S419. The vote was sixty-two nays, eleven yeas and twenty-seven not voting.
17 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (the Court declared unconstitutional several
Washington statutes requiring as a condition for employment, a loyalty oath to be taken by
state employees on the gound that the oath provided no ascertainable standard of conduct;
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (statute punishing "gangsters" and defining
as a gangster "any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member of
a gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at least three times of
being a disorderly person or who has been convicted of any crime," voided on vagueness
grounds); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (phrase "any crime involving moral
turpitude" held sufficiently definite in context of deportation legislation).
18 269 U.S. 385 (1925) (an Oklahoma statute providing for a certain minimum wage
"not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is
performed" held too vague a standard to enable a certain determination of what constitutes
a current wage in any locality).
19 Id. at 391.
20 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
21 Id. at 453
22 Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948). See also H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968).
630 [VOL. 4:3
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On close examination, it would appear that title X contains
several phrases that may be subject to a void for vagueness
attack. Perhaps the most obvious example would be the concept
of dangerousness, which is a requisite part of title X conviction.
23
The statute defines dangerousness 24 in terms of "protection of the
public from further criminal conduct."' 25 Nevertheless, the degree
of danger that is to serve as the standard remains indefinite.
The Supreme Court has primarily resorted to three related
approaches in attempting to determine the certainty of congres-
sional statutes. 26 In People v. Ruthenberg27 the Michigan Su-
preme Court rejected a vagueness attack on the Criminal Syndi-
calism Act of Michigan. The court held that terms such as "sabo-
tage" and "violence" have a definite meaning especially when
used in connection with the Communist Party.28 This holding
evinces the "common meaning" approach, which was also
adopted in United States v. Rumely29 and United States v. Har-
riss,30 involving the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.31 Peti-
tioner attacked, inter alia, a provision of the Act requiring regis-
tration of hired lobbyists. 32 The statute, it was contended, did not
adequately define "lobbying." In both cases, the Court rejected
this contention and instead held that "lobbying" should be treated
in its "commonly accepted sense." 33
A second approach utilized by the Court might be termed the
"technical or special meaning" approach as exemplified in Hy-
grade Provision Co. v. Sherman,34 which involved a statute pro-
viding punishment for the fraudulent sale of kosher meat. In
rejecting a vagueness claim, the Court held that the "term 'kosher'
23 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(e) (Supp. 1971).
2 The concept of dangerousness is not novel in the law. In Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d
964 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the district court dealt with the District of Columbia Sexual
Psychopath Act, 22 D. C. Code § 3503-11 (1967), which included a "dangerousness"
standard pertaining to sexual misconduct. Because the term is defined as "likely to attack
or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of his desire (§ 3503()),
the Court found no ambiguity in the use of "dangerousness" in connection with sexual
misconduct.
25 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(f)(Supp. 1971).
26 See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67, 69 (1960). The author states that except for the Lever Act involved in United
States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (192 1), and its progeny, no federal statute has
been struck down on a void for vagueness analysis.
27 229 Mich. 315, 201 N.W. 358 (1924).
2 8 id. at 325-26, 201 N.w. at 361.
345 U.S. 41 (1953).
30 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
31 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1946).
32 Id. § 267.
33 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (i953); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612, 620 (1954).
4 266 U.S. 497 (1925).
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has a meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged in the
trade to correctly apply it."35 In other cases the Supreme Court
has upheld statutes as sufficiently defined when contested terms
had specifically well-settled common-law meanings.3 6 This ap-
proach was also explained in United States v. Cohen Grocery
Co.3 7 as affording a standard "found to result either from the text
of the statute involved or the subjects with which they dealt."38,
The third approach utilized in Lanzetta v. New Jersey3 9 is an
attempt to adopt common usage as the applicable standard. The
Lanzetta case required a determination of the definitional clarity
of the term "gang," 40 The Court, citing five different dictionary
meanings and several sociological studies, found no certainty in
the term. The Court came to a similar conclusion concerning the
term "gangster" after a similar investigation before voiding the
statute on vagueness grounds.
The application of any of these three approaches does not seem
to remove the stigma of vagueness from the "dangerousness"
definition embodied in section 3575(f).41 Certainly, physical dan-
ger to the public would be the minimum level. Perhaps danger to
property is sufficient as the statute is now written. It is conceiv-
able under this Act that a union leader guilty of conspiracy to
incite a civil disturbance could be given the additional penalty on
the basis that he presented a danger to social tranquility. These
examples seem to accentuate the fact that dangerousness has
varied common meanings and usages. The tests of common usage
applied in Rumely, Ruthenberg and Lanzetta should not obviate
the apparent vagueness of such a term. Moveover, in the context
of criminal law where the only guidance is a "public protection"
standard, 42 dangerousness takes on no technical or special mean-
ing as in Connally. Finally, neither the text of the statute nor the
subject with which it deals seems to clarify the degree of dan-
5 Id. at 502.36 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1912) (upholding the Sherman Antitrust Act
and construing "restraint of trade" as being certain in a common law context).
37 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
38 Id. at 92. Perhaps the use of this technical approach explains the absence of success-
ful vagueness challenges against general statutes. As pointed out in Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1926) the decisions of the Court upholding statutes as
sufficiently certain, rested upon the conclusion that they employed words or phrases
having a technical or special meaning, well enough known to enable those within their
reach to correctly apply them.
39 306 U.S. 451 (1939).4 0 The term was defined under N. J. REV. STAT. § 2:136-4 (1937), as "consisting of two
or more persons."
41 "A defendant is dangerous for purposes of this section if a period of confinement
longer than that provided for such felony is required for the protection of the public from
further criminal conduct by the defendant."
4 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(f) (Supp. 1971).
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gerousness by which the court is to be guided. 43 The uncertainty
surrounding the applicable standard of dangerousness and the
necessity of guessing at the statute's prohibitory meaning is pre-
cisely what the Court held unconstitutional inoLanzetta.
Similar problems of vagueness will also be encountered under
the language of the professional offender provision where con-
gress attempts to define "special skill" 44 and "pattern of criminal
conduct." 45 In general, the Act defines special skill in terms of
unusual knowledge, or the ability to "facilitate" any managerial
aspect of a crime. Thus, while the Act does attempt to define
special skill, it does so only in terms equally ambiguous. What
constitutes unusual knowledge seems to be an unknown. For
example, one might ask whether an automobile thief s ability to
start a car constitutes special knowledge. Pattern of criminal
conduct is generally defined as criminal acts which have similar
purposes, participants, victims or are otherwise interrelated. This
definition leaves unclear the numbers or degrees of such activities.
Nevertheless, it should be recognized that both above definitions
must be given greater certainty by the additional language of the
provision that the activity must constitute a substantial source of
the defendant's income. 46 On the other hand, the requirements of
pattern of conduct, special skill, and substantial source of income
even when taken together do not seem to express or limit defini-
tively the concept of professional offender.
III. DUE PROCESS
A "sentencing" proceeding which could increase a two year
maximum sentence by twenty-five years, the amount authorized
under section 3575(a), may encounter serious due process objec-
tions. Indeed, it may be imperative that the sentence hearing, out
of which may come factual determinations as important as the
original determination of guilt, be bound by all the substantive due
process rules applicable to trial. The findings made by the court
43 Certainly, "dangerousness" would involve physical danger to the public. However,
the inclusion of conspiratorial defendants in title X may reflect congressional intent to
punish social disorders with which conspiracies are commonly associated as well as crimes
of violence.
44 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(e) (Supp. 1971) defines special skill or expertise in criminal
conduct to include, "unusual knowledge, judgment or ability, including manual dexterity,
facilitating the initiation, organizing, planning, financing, direction, management, supervi-
sion, execution or concealment of the criminal conduct, the enlistment of accomplices in
such conduct ... or the disposition of the fruits or proceeds of such conduct."
45 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(e) (Supp. 197 1) provides that "criminal conduct forms a pattern
if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing charac-
teristics and are not isolated events."
4 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(e)(2) (Supp. 1971).
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under title X, and the resulting power to punish, differ substan-
tially from the sentencing process involved in a typical recidivist
statute.
The constitutionality of the practice of imposing severe crimi-
nal penalties upon habitual offenders is no longer open to serious
challenge. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the valid-
ity of state recidivist statutes in a variety of contexts. As early as
Graham v. West Virginia,47 the Court recognized that trial of a
prior offender, under a provision imposing additional imprison-
ment, violated no constitutional prohibition. While denial of an
opportunity to obtain counsel in the face of an habitual criminal
accusation has been held a clear violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 48 the Court has required no
more than that the defendant be given a reasonable opportunity to
defend against the habitual criminal accusation, 49 and has not
invalidated convictions obtained through selective enforcement. 50
Furthermore, as recently as 1967, the Supreme Court said that a
procedure whereby the jury was allowed to consider evidence of
the defendant's prior convictions, upon the instruction that such
matters were not to be considered in passing upon defendant's
guilt or innocence on the pending charge, was not an uncon-
stitutional means of serving the valid state purpose of enforcing
habitual criminal statutes. 51
It is important to recognize that title X differs considerably from
the typical recidivist statutes involved above in which the trier of
fact had only to establish the accused's identity, consider his past
criminal record, and set punishment accordingly. A defendant
may be classified a "special offender" if he is found to meet any
one of three sets of criteria. The first set 52 involves a determina-
tion of the defendant's past criminal record, an issue much like
that to which recidivist statutes are normally addressed. How-
ever, the last two sets of criteria involve quite different issues.
The judge must determine if the defendant displayed a pattern of
criminal conduct which constituted a substantial source of his
income and in which he manifested special skill. 53 This seems
equivalent to a determination of guilt. The final criterion requires
similar determinations to be made in proceedings against con-
spiratorial offenders. 54 Whether there was a conspiracy involving
47 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
48 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443
(1962).
9 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).5 0 id.
51 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
52 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(e)(1) (Supp. 1971).
53 Id. § 3575(e)(2).
54 Id. § 3575(e)(3).
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a pattern of criminal conduct, and whether the defendant agreed
to initiate, organize, plan, finance, direct, manage or supervise
such conduct, are all inquiries which the judge alone must deter-
mine. Under each of the three special offender classifications, the
judge must decide the additional question of whether the defend-
ant is "dangerous," i.e., that confinement for longer than the
penalty for the underlying felony is necessary to protect the
public.5 5 The answers to these questions, decided without a jury
and without full trial procedures, can be the basis of a sentence of
up to twenty-five years.56
The Supreme Court has had an opportunity to rule on the
problem of distinguishing between determination of guilt and dis-
cretion in sentencing which will most likely arise in cases under
title X. The leading case of Williams v. New York57 involved a
defendant convicted of murder in the first degree, with a jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment. The judge considered out-
side information as to appellant's previous criminal record without
permitting appellant to confront or cross-examine the witnesses
on that subject. Citing, inter alia, the probation report's con-
clusion, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death.58 The
Supreme Court, on review, upheld the judge's sentence. The
Court distinguished between the trial contest which is confined to
the issue of guilt and the sentencing procedure:
A sentencing judge, however, is not confined to the narrow
issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional
limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after
the issue of guilt has been determined. 59
The Court voiced a broad conception of the judge's role in the
normal sentencing process:
[Miodern concepts of individualizing punishment have made
it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied
an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a require-
ment of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence .... 60
The decision in Williams, however, did not settle the issue.
Again, the Supreme Court considered the problems of sentencing
and habitual offenders in Specht v. Patterson.61 In Specht, the
appellant was convicted of the crime of indecent liberties under a
55 Id. § 3575(0.
56 Id. § 3575(b).
57 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
58 Id. at 242.
59 Id. at 247.
6o Id.
61 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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Colorado statute which carried a maximum sentence of ten years.
Petitioner was sentenced, however, under the state Sex Offenders
Act for an indeterminate term of from one day to life imprison-
ment.6 2 On review, the Supreme Court struck down the sentenc-
ing procedure, because the Sex Offender Act in Specht did not
make the commission of a specified crime the basis for sentenc-
ing:
It makes one conviction the basis for commencing another
proceeding under another Act to determine whether a person
constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public .... That is a
new finding of fact ... that was not an ingredient of the
offense charged. 63
The Court held that this new finding of fact amounted to an
additional charge leading to increased criminal punishment. The
defendant, therefore, had to be granted greater protections under
the due process clause than those referred to in Williams, in
which all the court had to do was determine the defendant's prior
convictions. These additional protections include the right to pres-
ence of counsel, to testify in one's own behalf, to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, to offer evidence on one's own behalf,
and to receive findings of fact adequate to make meaningful any
permissible appeal. 64
The Specht Court relied on the United States Court of Ap-
peals' decision in Gerchman v. Maroney.65 The statute involved
in Gerchman is remarkably similar to the Act in question here.
Under the Pennsylvania Barr-Walker Act,66 the trial court may
sentence a person to an indeterminate term after a conviction of a
specified sex crime and a finding by the court that the defendant
"if at large would constitute a threat of bodily harm" to the public.
In addressing the question of how the scope of due process rights
are to be applied, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
distinguished Williams on the basis that the Barr-Walker process
was criminal, constituting an essentially independent proceeding,
rather than a mere sentencing procedure. The issues in Gerchman
involved a new factual determination, similar to the determination
62 The Colorado Sex Offender Act applied if the trial court believed that a defendant
convicted of a specified sex offense "if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to
members of the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill." (Id. at 607). This
provision should be compared to the corresponding title X provision: "A defendant is
dangerous for purposes of this section if a period of confinement longer than that provided
for such felony is required for the protection of the public from further criminal conduct by
the defendant." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(f) (Supp. 197 1).
63 386 U.S. at 608.
6 Id. at 608-I1.
- 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
66 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19. §§ 1166-74 (1964).
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of dangerousness under title X, which could result in a much
enlarged punishment for an essentially independent criminal
offense. 67 The defendant's conviction was not allowed to stand for
two reasons: the sentencing was based solely on a hearing com-
mission's report containing a confidential psychiatric examination
and a probation investigation; and the defendant was deprived of
his right to confront and cross-examine the witness against him.68
If "due process embodies the differing rules of fair
play ... associated with differing types of proceedings, " 69 then
certainly the relevant protections referred to in Gerchman take on
added significance in the context of the discretion given the judge
under title X. Since the due process protections must be expanded
to comply with the rights demanded by the nature of the proceed-
ing, the possibility of heavy penalties under title X would seem to
require protection relatively equivalent to that afforded in the
original determination of guilt. One commentator, in discussing
the constitutional implications of title X before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee, 70 stated that Williams would not support
taking issues wholesale from the jury to give them to the judge for
resolution at the time of sentencing; it would not, for example,
justify a life sentence for a parking ticket because the judge
found as part of the sentencing process that the defendant
also committed a premeditated murder.7 '
Though the example may be rather extreme, it raises fundamental
issues. On constitutional analysis, it would seem that the factual
basis of a determination of guilt which prompts the major portion
of a long term sentence should be proved to a jury in the normal
criminal trial. Under title X, the judge is in fact assessing the
defendant's guilt in an expedited sentencing scheme. While the
Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the idea that the judge
should have considerable discretion in sentencing criminal defend-
ants, 72 that discretion may not be as broad as title X suggests.
67 355 F.2d at 309.
68 Id. at 311.
69 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
70 Remarks of Professor Peter Low of the University of Virginia Law School. Senate
Hearings 184-213.
71 Id. 187 n.5. Professor Low spoke of a thirty year penalty because under the initial
draft of the Act the judge could sentence a defendant to thirty years. This was reduced in
the House bill to twenty-five years.72 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The Court held that while basic fifth
amendment guarantees against double jeopardy are violated when time already served for
an offense is not fully credited in imposing a new sentence after retrial, there is no absolute
constitutional bar to imposing a more severe sentence on reconviction. The Court added,
however, that the reasons for imposition after retrial of a more severe sentence must
affirmatively appear in the record and must be based on objective information concerning
the defendant's identifiable conduct after the original sentencing proceeding.
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Probably the most basic constitutional question involved in the
sentencing provision of title X is whether the right to trial by jury
can be denied a defendant simply by calling the judge's function
"sentencing." The factual determinations of dangerousness, pat-
tern of criminal conduct, and conspiracy are closely analogous
issues usually reserved to the decisions of a jury in the traditional
trial setting. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made clear that
the severity of possible punishment is a major factor in deciding if
the trial is subject to sixth amendment mandates, 73 and that an
offense carrying penalties of more than a few months will entitle
the accused to a jury trial. 74 This argument for the requirement of
jury trial does not answer the fundamental question of whether
the decision made by the judge really constitutes a "trial." How-
ever it does point up the fact that by casting the court's discretion
in the sentencing format, the necessity of providing a jury trial of
issues possibly leading to severe punishment is avoided.
Similarly avoided are traditional rules of admissibility of evi-
dence. Title X places no limitation on the type of "information"
the court may receive in assessing the defendant's special offender
status. 75 The unlimited definition given to "information" -that
which concerns the background, character, and conduct of de-
fendant-would seem to include hearsay, rumor, and even illegal-
ly seized evidence. While it is not clear that a court in this setting
would or could admit the latter under the exclusionary rule of
Weeks v. United States, 76 to do so would clearly encourage law
enforcement officials to use any method to obtain evidence dam-
aging to the defendant. Indeed, once the initial basis of underlying
crime can be proven, there is no practical reason why the police
would not be predisposed to employ illegal methods to help the
prosecution convince the judge of title X status. While these
73 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625-27 (1937). The Court held,
however, that an offense punishable by fine of not more than three hundred dollars or
imprisonment of not more than ninety days, is to be classed as a petty offense and may be
tried without a jury.
74 Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), held that crimes carrying possible
penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty
offenses. The recent case of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), held that the
fourteenth amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which, were they
to be tried in a federal court, would come within the sixth amendment's guarantee of a jury
trial. The Court reversed the conviction of the defendant on a battery charge, a mis-
demeanor punishable by fine of not more than three hundred dollars or imprisonment for
not more than two years or both. The defendant had actually been sentenced to a sixty-day
term. Compare Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), upholding Federal Rule
23(a)'s provision conditioning an accused's waiver of a jury trial on the court's approval
and the Government's consent.
75 18 U.S.C.A. § 3577 (Supp. 1971).
76 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks held that the fourth amendment prevents the use of
evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure in a federal prosecution. See Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), extending exclusionary rules to state courts.
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possibilities may be avoided by the courts, it is clear that title X
contains few internal controls on admissibility of prejudicial, ir-
relevant or even illegal information.
The problem of admissibility of evidence should be put in the
perspective of other due process safeguards afforded the defend-
ant. He is advised at the time of the indictment of his status under
title X, 7 7 and the court can take steps to insure that the defend-
ant's trial is not prejudiced by disclosure of that fact. 78 Prior to
sentencing under title X, the defendant is entitled to notice and a
hearing at which he can have the assistance of counsel, com-
pulsory process, and the right to cross-examine such witnesses as
appear at the hearing. 79 The United States and counsel for the
defendant or the defendant himself also have the right to inspect
the presentence report a reasonable time before the hearing. 0
This right of the defendant to inspect the presentence report,
one of the more important sources of information to the judge in
considering a sentence, is hesitantly given because title X further
provides that:
In extraordinary cases, the court may withhold material not
relevant to a proper sentence, diagnostic opinion which might
seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, any source of
information obtained on a promise of confidentiality, and ma-
terial previously disclosed in open court."'
The judge must inform the parties when he withholds such in-
formation and state the reason in the record,8 2 but a decision to
prevent disclosure in a proceeding in which the defendant has so
much at stake still raises serious questions of propriety and funda-
mental fairness.
Initially, it is not clear why the provision allows the judge to
withhold irrelevant material. If there exists certain material irrele-
vant to a proper sentence and yet the judge has, in fact, consid-
ered it, there appears to be no valid reason why it should not be
included in the record and made known to all parties. The two
other situations in which the judge may withhold information, i.e.,
where there is a diagnostic opinion, and where the material was
previously disclosed in open court, may not seriously hinder the
defendant in the preparation of his case against the imposition of
dangerous special offender status. However, the language which
77 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(a) (Supp. 1971).
78 Id.
- Id. § 3575(b).80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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permits withholding information obtained on a promise of con-
fidentiality may be quite deleterious to the defendant in preparing
his case.
This question of the disclosure of identity upon a promise of
confidentiality should be read in light of developments in the area
of police and prosecution nondisclosure of informants' identity,
since the statute does not explain upon whose promise the mate-
rial may be withheld. The Supreme Court passed on the question
of the informer's privilege in McCray v. Illinois,8 3 holding that the
police do not have to disclose the identity of an informer at a
probable cause hearing. The Court was careful, however, to dis-
tinguish between a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence
where the issue was probable cause to arrest, and instances where
the privilege was invoked at a trial for determination of ultimate
guilt. In the latter situation, the informer's privilege is severely
restricted. In Roviaro v. United States,84 the Court treated non-
disclosure at trial by saying:
Where disclosure of an informer's identity, or the contents of
his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of
the accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause,
the privilege must give way. 85
The Court has sought in a variety of contexts to protect an
accused's right of access to prosecution information which may be
helpful in preparing a defense. In Jencks v. United States,86 a case
decided soon after Roviaro, the Court held that the accused were
entitled to inspect the reports made to the FBI by two undercover
agents who testified at trial. More importantly, the court dis-
approved of the practice of producing government documents to
the trial judge for his determination of relevancy and materiality
without hearing the accused.8 7 Similarly, in Brady v. Maryland88
the Court said that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to the accused, i.e., an accomplice's statement admitting
the killing, violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution. It also appears that unless the Govern-
ment prefers to dismiss a case rather than disclose information
obtained through illegal eavesdropping, persons having the proper
standing are entitled to examine the government's eavesdropping
- 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
353 U.S. 53 (1957).
85 Id. at 60- 6 1.
- 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
87 Id. at 669.
88 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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records, to determine to what extent the eavesdropping may have
contributed to the prosecution's case. 89
The rights of confrontation and cross-examination granted in
section 3575 will indeed be illusory if the identities of key wit-
nesses are withheld upon "a promise of confidentiality." For
example, the defendant need not be convicted on a conspiracy
charge to be given an additional sentence as a conspiracy
offender, and the judge is evidently authorized to conclude that a
conspiracy took place on the basis of information given by an
alleged co-conspirator whose identity may be withheld. All this
might occur despite the Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of
the accused's right to access to sources of prosecutorial in-
formation and the Court's decisions since Pointer v. Texas9"
construing the accused's constitutional right to confront the wit-
nesses against him. 91 A defendant's right to a fair trial may be
severely impaired if the ultimate rationale for the judge's decision
is hidden behind confidential or irrelevant information and the
nonappearance of damaging informants.
There are, on the other hand, three principal reasons given for
nondisclosure of certain information: (1) that sources of in-
formation would dry up; (2) that full disclosure would turn a
sentencing hearing into a longer affair than the initial trial; and (3)
that full disclosure may harm the defendant's eventual chances of
89 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). On the standing issue, the Court
held that co-conspirators and codefendants whose rights were not directly violated by the
illegal eavesdropping had no standing to object to the admission of the fruits of eaves-
dropping. The owner of the premises, on the other hand, did have standing even if he was
not present and did not participate in the conversation which was overheard.
90 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
91 In Pointer, the Supreme Court established that the right granted an accused by the
sixth amendment to confront witnesses against him, which includes the right of
cross-examination, is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial and is made obligatory on
the states by the fourteenth amendment. The conviction in the state proceeding was
reversed, since the introduction of the transcript of a preliminary hearing in a federal
criminal case would have been a clear denial of the right of confrontation if there had, as
here, been no cross-examination. In the companion case of Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415 (1965), the Court held that the petitioner's inability to cross-examine an alleged
accomplice about a purported confession implicating the petitioner and the prosecutor's
reading of the confession in cross-examination, even though the accomplice refused to
testify on fifth amendment grounds, denied petitioner the right to cross-examine the
witness. Three years later in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court
reversed the conviction of a defendant at a joint trial because the trial court admitted the
codefendant's confession inculpating the defendant. This was held to violate the petition-
er's right of cross-examination, despite the court's qualifying instruction. But see Califor-
nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), which held that the prior statement of a witness made
at a preliminary hearing, under oath, and subject to full cross-examination by defendant's
counsel was admissible, and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) which upheld
Georgia's co-conspirator hearsay exception, even though it did not coincide with the
narrower exception applicable in federal conspiracy trials. Georgia's rule allowed into
evidence a co-conspirator's out-of-court statement made during the concealment phase of
the conspiracy.
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rehabilitation. 92 After a study of reports and testimony drawn
from jurisdictions which lived with a system of full disclosure, an
ABA study committee rejected all three justifications. 93 To de-
prive the defendant of a chance to attack the evidence against him
weakens what faith he has in the judicial system. Conversely, by
affording access to such information, the defendant is at least
given the opportunity to arrive at some understanding of the
sentencing process. 94 Finally, full disclosure, with the limited
exception of diagnostic material, might result in the improved
quality of investigation and reporting. 95  On strictly policy
grounds, then, there is an argument that title X is not the best
approach to a special penal problem.
Analogous constitutional arguments can be raised against the
final phrase of the sentencing process under title X. After all the
evidence from whatever source has been submitted, the judge is
to make his finding of "dangerous special offender" on a bare
"preponderance of the information," 96 rather than the usual stan-
dard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" often cited as an element of
due process in criminal cases. 97 Though Williams v. New York9"
clearly allows a standard below reasonable doubt in the normal
sentencing hearing, determinations by the judge under title X
involve considerably more important issues than in the usual
92 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 218- 23 (Tent. Draft, Dec. 1967), reprinted in part L.
HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1074-77
(3d ed. 1969).
93 The study committee concluded that the first reason had no basis in fact. See also P.
TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 558 (1960), pointing out that disclosure is
needed to offset the reports "in which emotionally intoned value judgments are liberally
distributed, diagnostic terms loosely and inaccurately used, (and) prejudicial epithets
('immoral', 'depraved', 'corrupt') employed." The second proposition was rejected as an
attempt to avoid providing constitutional protections on the ground of expedience. Such
nondisclosure would prevent the defense attorney from adequately representing the de-
fendant. MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE supra note 92, at 1076. Even if legitimate, the
final rationale was unacceptable in the view of the ABA committee as a justification for
denying the disclosure of any information relevant to the defense of the accused. Id. 1077.
Full disclosure may be an important aid in the possible rehabilitation of a defendant. When
an individual is placed in prison without learning of the exact reason for the imposition of
his sentence, his willingness to cooperate is reduced greatly. Speech by B. James Wright,
Director of Citizens Probation Authority, Genessee County, Michigan, to the Institute for
Continuing Legal Research, Detroit, Michigan, Jan., 22, 1971. His ability to mentally
adjust to prison life is similarly affected. To remove this mental block would in many
instances greatly enhance the chances of eventual rehabilitation. Id.
94 S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 93 (1963).
95 P. TAPPAN, supra note 93, at 558.
96 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(b) (Supp. 1971).
97 See Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953). See
generally Waiver of Jury Unanimity-Some Doubts About Reasonable Doubt, 21 U. CHI.
L. REV. 438 (1954); Ryan, Less Than Unanimous Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 58 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 211 (1967).
98 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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criminal case. Specht v. Patterson99 stands for the principle that a
defendant must be afforded certain due process procedural rights
in a particular kind of sentencing hearing in which there is a
separate determination of fact which may lead to an increased
term. Surely title X is more like the statute involved in Specht
than the one in Williams-whether the defendant is dangerous and
belongs to one of the three categories of special offender seem to
be independent determinations of fact. If this is the case, the
prosecution should be required to meet a reasonable doubt stan-
dard before the defendant can constitutionally be subjected to the
increased penalties of title X. Yet, even should the preponderance
of the information standard be found within the requirements of
due process when standing alone, considered in conjunction with
the other provisions of the Act, the constitutionality of title X
must be questioned.
IV. PRESUMPTIONS
The legislative presumption established by section 3575(e) is
also vulnerable to a due process challenge. For a defendant to be
properly placed in the special offender category under this provi-
sion, it is only necessary that three conditions be fulfilled: (1) the
felony must be a part of a criminal pattern of conduct; (2) the
defendant must exhibit a special skill or expertise in the commis-
sion of the crime; and (3) the income derived from the criminal
pattern of conduct must account for a substantial portion of the
defendant's income. The section provides that substantial proper-
ty or income in a defendant's name or under his control, otherwise
unexplained, may be presumed to be derived from a criminal
pattern of conduct. This provision thus shifts the burden of proof
necessary to classify a defendant as a "special offender" under
section 3575(e) from the prosecution to the defendant. Therefore,
the defendant must satisfactorily explain the sources of his in-
come and property in order to rebut the presumption they they
flowed to him as the fruits of a criminal pattern of conduct.
It is well established that legislatures have the power to regu-
late the introduction of evidence in the courts.100 The estab-
lishment of a presumption is merely an exercise of this authority
99 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
100 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893). The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of a statute which declared that the failure of a Chinese alien to have a
certificate of residence in his possession gave rise to a natural inference of an intentional
failure to procure such a certificate and unlawful residence in the United States. See also
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943); Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219
U.S. 35, 42 (1910): Adams v. New York. 192 U.S. 585. 599 (1904).
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to prescribe what evidence is admissible, 10 1 whether in criminal102
or civil cases.103 However, the authority of Congress to create
such presumptions is limited by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.' 0 4 Early cases were unclear as to exactly what limits
were imposed by the due process clause, 10 5 but the Supreme
Court, in Tot v. United States,0 6 adopted the "rational con-
nection" test between the basic fact and the presumed fact. In
Tot, the Court struck down a statutory inference that possession
of a firearm or ammunition by a person convicted of a crime of
violence was presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammuni-
tion was shipped in interstate or foreign commerce. In invalidating
the presumption, the Court declared that "a statutory presump-
tion cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection be-
tween the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed ... "107
Because some states did not have firearms registration require-
ments, the firearms could have been acquired unlawfully, or prior
to the adoption of state regulations, or prior to the adoption of the
statute. Thus the Court felt that a rational connection between the
fact proved (possession) and the fact presumed (illegal interstate
shipment) did not exist.'08
The "rational connection" test, originally promulgated in two
civil cases, 10 9 has been employed by the Supreme Court in four
cases involving criminal statutory presumptions handed down
since Tot. In Leary v. United States, 10 which invalidated the
statutory presumption that possession of marijuana was prima
101 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893); Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
102 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). In Adams, a legislative presumption that
possession of a policy slip was evidence of knowing possession thereof was held valid.
Similarly, in Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922), the presumption that the physical
presence of a still was evidence that the person in actual possession of the premises knew
of its existence was sustained.
103 Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910), involved the inference in
a Mississippi statute that injury to persons or property by railroads was prima facie
evidence of want of skill on the part of the railroad.104 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
105 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 32 (1969). These tests included asking whether
there was a "rational connection" between the basic fact and presumed fact, whether the
basic fact from which the presumption authorized the inference was itself a crime, and
whether it was more convenient for the defendant, as opposed to the prosecution, to
produce the facts. Id. at 32, n.56.
106 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
107 Id. at 467.
108 Id. at 468.
109 Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (19 10); McFarland v. American
Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916). In McFarland, the Court enjoined the threatened
enforcement of a statute which made a sugar refinery's act of paying a lower price for
sugar in Louisiana than in other states presumptive evidence that the refinery was a party
to a conspiracy to monopolize.
110 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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facie evidence of illegal importation and that the defendant knew
of such illegal importation, the Court stated "a criminal statutory
presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary' and
hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substan-
tial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to
flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend."'' After
empirical examination of the importation of marijuana, the Court
concluded that most domestically consumed marijuana is in fact
imported." 2 Nevertheless, the Court still struck down the pre-
sumption. It was impossible, the Court believed, to state that
marijuana users were aware of the origin of the product they were
consuming, because a significant percentage of domestically con-
sumed marijuana may not have been imported." 3 The Court
rejected the hypothesis that possessors of marijuana were aware
of the proportion actually imported, without proof to that
effect."14
For the section 3575(e) presumption to be sustained under the
Leary test, it must be more likely than not that a defendant who
has committed a felony which is part of a special pattern of
criminal conduct, and who has exhibited some special expertise,
draws a substantial part of his income from such pattern of con-
duct. For a source of income to be "substantial" under the Act,
it must exceed $3200 over a period of one year," 5 and equal over
one-half of the defendant's adjusted gross income under section
62 of the Internal Revenue Code."6 Thus a factory worker who
sold betting cards at his place of employment, netting $1500
yearly out of a total income of nine thousand dollars yearly, would
be subject to the presumption of section 3575(e), although he
would not come within the "substantial source of income" defini-
tion. To maintain that it is more likely than not that such a felon,
with such expertise, derives a substantial source of his income
from such criminal activity borders on the specious. Under the
I" Id. at 37.
112 Id. at 44.
113 Id. at 46.
11 In the 1970 case of Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970), the Supreme
Court utilized the same standard as in Leary to sustain a similar legislative presumption
regarding heroin and to invalidate one involving cocaine. The other two cases in which the
Supreme Court has examined a criminal statutory presumption are United States v.
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), and United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965). In the
former, the presumption that a defendant's presence at an illegal still was evidence that he
was carrying on the business of a distiller was allowed to stand. In the latter, the
presumption that a defendant's presence at an operating still was evidence of his control
over it was held unconsititutional, because the defendant's presence at the still, without
proof of his function, had too tenuous a connection with control.
11 This figure is based on the minimum wage as set down in 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1)
(Supp. 1970) for a forty hour week and a fifty week year.
11( 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(e) (Supp. 1971).
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Leary test, there can be no "substantial assurance" that the pre-
sumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the established
fact in such a situation. The fact that the defendant has access to
the information which can rebut the presumption cannot sustain
an otherwise invalid presumption.11 7 To analogize section 3575(e)
to the Leary line of cases might be questioned because the uncon-
stitutional statutory presumptions all involved determinations of
guilt rather than of sentencing. For the reasons discussed in the
preceding section, however, it would seem permissible to regard
a title X proceeding as a de facto determination of guilt. In any
event, the due process standard has been applied to both civil and
criminal statutory presumptions. n 8
V. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The last major area of controversy embodied in title X is the
provision allowing either the defendant or the prosecutor to ap-
peal sentences rendered under the Act.11 9 This will, no doubt,
raise double jeopardy challenges. Most appeals of criminal cases
are currently initiated by the defendant and not the prosecutor.
Those instances in which prosecutors may appeal from erroneous
trial rulings appear to be limited to some state proceedings, l20 and
the only appeal previously allowed the federal government applied
to interlocutory orders.' 21
Section 3576 concerns only the "imposition, correction, or
reduction of the sentence" after the title X sentencing hearing. It
117 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 32-34 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.
463, 467, 469- 70 (1943).
118 The § 3575(e) presumption may also violate the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, in that the presumption applies unless the defendant comes forward to
explain the sources of his property and income. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 76
(1965) (Black, J. dissenting); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432 (1970) (Black &
Douglas, JJ., dissenting). "Presumptions ... tend to coerce and compel the defendant into
taking the witness stand in his own behalf, in clear violation of the accused's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 432. However, in Gainey, the
Court held that a statutory presumption that presence at an illegal still was presumptive
evidence of the crime of carrying on the business of a distillery was not a comment on the
defendant's failure to take the stand in his own behalf. Similarly, in the latest Supreme
Court pronouncement on the issue, it was noted that the lower court had rejected the
petitioner's self-incrimination claim, and that the high court was addressing itself to
another issue. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 403 (1970). Several United States
Court of Appeals decisions have specifically addressed the self-incrimination claim and
rejected it. United States v. Turner, 404 F.2d 782 (3d Cir. 1968), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1966);
United States v. Secondino, 347 F.2d 725 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 931 (1965);
Williams v. United States, 328 F.2d 256 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 969 (1964).
119 18 U.S.C.A. § 3576 (Supp. 1971).
120 See, e.g., State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 A. 1110 (1894); State v. Witte, 243 Wis.
423, 10 N.W.2d 117 (1943).
12 1 18 U.S.C. §§ 3731, 25 18(10) (1964).
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allows for appeal by either party to the court of appeals.' 22 At the
same time, the section provides several safeguards for the defend-
ant. To prevent the prosecutor from appealing as a harassment
technique, any review by the United States must be taken at least
five days prior to the defendant's deadline. Moreover, any appeal
by the Government becomes an automatic appeal by the defend-
ant. If an appeal is taken by either party, the court of appeals is
authorized to affirm or remand any sentence. In addition, the
appeals court may impose or direct imposition on any sentence
which the sentencing court could have originally imposed. How-
ever, any increase in sentence may only be pursuant to a Govern-
ment appeal and following a court hearing. 123 Finally, the court of
appeals must include in the record the reasons for its decision.
A study of these provisions of title X suggests that a double
jeopardy attack on this section may be made on the basis of
Kepner v. United States. 24 In that case the Supreme Court held
governmental appeal from an acquittal would violate the double
jeopardy prohibition of the sixth amendment. Although Kepner is
still good law, present interpretations of that case might well
emphasize the fact that the case was appealed on the question of
guilt. Modern cases still forbid relitigation that will result in a
finding of greater guilt. For example, in Green v. United States,125
the defendant was charged with first degree murder, but convicted
of second degree. After successfully appealing his conviction, he
was retried and convicted on the original first degree charge. The
122 This section is ambiguous in the sense that it doesn't specify which sentence may be
appealed. It would seem that the obvious intent of this section would be to allow appeal of
the "special offender" sentencing only. However, under a reasonable reading, the prose-
cutor could also appeal the sentence for the underlying or triggering offense. This could
come about where the trial judge refused a finding of special offender status.
123 18 U.S.C.A. § 3576 (Supp. 1971), includes three provisions each underlining the
proposition that there may be no increase in sentence upon defendant's appeal.
124 195 U.S. 100 (1904). Although prior to this decision, the Supreme Court had in
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), upheld the permissibility of retrial after
reversal on defendant's appeal of a guilty finding, Kepner did not fall within the parameters
of the principal theory that has been advanced to support retrial after reversal. This theory
was articulated in United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964), where the Court suggested
that retrial following reversal was proper based on the society's interest in punishing a
guilty defendant who obtains reversal merely on technical grounds. The Kepner decision is
distinguishable from the Ball decision on the ground that the defendant in Ball had
achieved reversal of his conviction on the basis of procedural defects in the indictment
thus permitting retrial of the issue of his guilt, whereas the defendant in Kepner was
acquitted after a trial on the merits by the jury. Thus, in the words of the Kepner court,
"we are not here dealing with [a situation in which defendant] is legally put in jeopardy, as
where a discharge is had upon a motion to quash, or a demurrer to the indictment ....
195 U.S. at 130. Thus, where acquittal is based on reversal due to technical or procedural
defects, retrial of the issue of guilt is permissible. However, where a competent court has
convicted the accused on the merits of the accusation, the double jeopardy clause bars his
retrial.
125 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the original jury
decision implied an acquittal of the first degree charge. The Court
thereby determined that a decision for lesser guilt creates a double
jeopardy bar to relitigation producing greater guilt.
The question of guilt or innocence is not what Congress appar-
ently intended, however, in drafting title X. Instead, the role of
the judge purportedly is sentencing. The judge determines wheth-
er the defendant falls within the special offender provisions and, if
so, the length of additional sentence to be imposed.126 If the
Government appeals, then the appellate court may affirm, reverse,
remand, or itself impose any sentence the trial court could have
originally imposed. 127 If the proceeding under title X is only a
mechanism for altering the sentence, then it is a proceeding which
has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. In North Carolina v.
Pearce,'28 the Court held that the fifth amendment double jeop-
ardy clause consists of three factors: 129 (1) protection against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 130 (2)
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after
a conviction;' 3 ' and (3) protection against multiple punish-
ments.' 32 The Court qualifiedthis second factor by citing the
precedent established in United States v. Ball that the defendant
may always be retried after he succeeds in getting his first con-
viction reversed, 33 and that if the defendant is reconvicted, the
court may impose a legally authorized sentence whether or not it
is greater than the sentence imposed after the first conviction. 34
Nevertheless, realizing that due process problems might arise
because of "retaliatory motivations" by a judge against defend-
ants who successfully appeal, the Court created a new test with
which the trial court must comply. Whenever a judge imposes a
more severe sentence, the reasons must be based upon "objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the
defendant occurring after the time of the original sentence pro-
ceeding." 35
126 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(b) (Supp. 1971).
127 Id. § 3576.
128 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
129 Id. at 717.
130 Citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), and Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184 (1957).
131 Citing In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889)
132 Citing United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
133 395 U.S. at 719-20:
At least since 1896, when United States v. Ball ... was decided, it has been
settled that this constitutional guarantee imposes no limitations whatever
upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his first
conviction set aside.
134 395 U.S. at 720.
135 Id. at 726. In addition, these factors must be placed on the record for further appeal.
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Three arguments may be asserted that would deny Pearce
controlling effect over the application of title X. First, it can be
suggested that Kepner should be read to prohibit still all govern-
ment appeals. Second, it may be alleged that the special test set
forth in Pearce cannot be met by either the appellate or trial court
on remand because the basis for overturning the title X sentence
was not objective information gained by the court about defend-
ant's conduct after the first sentencing. Finally, and most im-
portantly, the defendant may argue that the trial court's determi-
nation under title X is really a judgment of guilt and not a sentenc-
ing determination. If title X does create judgments on guilt, then
the prohibitions of Green v. United States,136 since not only
approved but applied to the states through Benton v. Maryland,3 7
deny a relitigation that could entail a finding of greater guilt.
Moreover, there are several countervailing policy reasons mili-
tating against the prosecutor's appeal provision in title X. Perhaps
the most convincing argument is the added plea bargaining power
that such a measure would inherently bestow upon the United
States Attorneys. In a statement to the Senate Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures, one critic of the provision made
the following observations:
Of course, one of the major difficulties posed by the sentenc-
ing structure suggested by this bill is the fact that an addition-
al weapon-the capacity to charge or not to charge an
offender with being a recidivist or a professional offender-is
added to the arsenal of the prosecutor available for use in the
guilty plea bargaining process .... In many if not most cases,
a more serious charge is possible as an inducement to plead
guilty to a less serious offense .... 138
The danger embodied in such an extension of power becomes all
the more important when analyzed in light of the scope of the
offenses involved. Title X will be available for use in most con-
spiracy cases as well as individual cases involving "professional
offenders." In view of the recent Supreme Court decision in-
volving acceptance of guilty pleas by a hesitant defendant,139 the
magnitude of this inherent power is greatly increased.
In concurring, Justice Douglas expressed the belief that under no circumstances should a
greater punishment be imposed after successful attack of a previous conviction. Id. at
732-33. Justice Harlan agreed with this rationale given in the decision in Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) which made the double jeopardy clause binding on the
states through the fourteenth amendment.
136 See text accompanying note 125 supra.
137 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
13 Senate Hearings 197 (remarks by Professor Peter Low of University of Virginia
Law School).
139 In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Supreme Court greatly ex-
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A second reason for eliminating the government's right to ap-
peal is based upon the traditional nature of the sentencing pro-
cess. Sentencing is the function of the judge, not the prosecutor.
As stated by the Supreme Court in Williams v. New York, the
sentencing judge's "task within fixed statutory or constitutional
limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the
issue of guilt has been determined.' 40 The American Bar Associ-
ation, citing an English study of the judge's role in sentencing,
said that the prosecutor's appeal, though logical, "would be a
complete departure from our tradition that the prosecutor takes
no part, or the minimum part, in the sentencing process."' 41
VI. CONCLUSION
Title X is an attempt to deal with an urgent problem. The need
to protect the public from the oppression of organized crime
cannot be doubted. However, urgency alone does not justify the
abandonment of either constitutional principles or common sense.
Much of the language in title X does seem to threaten con-
stitutional rights even if not to abridge them. Certainly, by con-
gressional intent, the title X defendant is not to be given those
rights that inhere in the ordinary criminal process where facts are
applied to purported wrongdoing and the guilt thereof is deter-
mined.
panded the courts' ability to accept guilty pleas despite a disclaimer of-guilt. Appellee was
indicted on a first degree murder charge. Appellee's attorney recommended and the
prosecutor accepted a plea of guilty for second degree murder. Appellee so pleaded,
although disclaiming guilt, because of the threat of the death penalty upon a finding of
guilty by a jury. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the guilty plea was in-
voluntary. The Supreme Court reversed the appeals court. The Court held that the
standard remains "whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among
the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Id. at 31. Attaching great weight
to defendant's representation of competent counsel, the Court. refused to find a violation of
this standard:
Confronted with the choice between a trial for first-degree murder, on the
one hand, and a plea of guilty to second-degree murder, on the other, Alford
quite reasonably chose the latter and thereby limited the maximum penalty to
a 30-year term. When his plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him,
which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further pro-
vided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being
intelligently entered ... its validity cannot be seriously questioned. Id. at
37-38.
140 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949).
141 See ABA STANDARDS, APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, 141-42 (Tent. Draft.
April, 1967). See also Professor Low's comments in Senate Hearings 197.
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